Napoleon's Military Maxims by G. Chandler David;

Author:G. Chandler, David;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: The History Press
Published: 2015-09-13T16:00:00+00:00

XVIII

A general of ordinary talent occupying a bad position, and surprised by a superior force, seeks his safety in retreat; but a great captain supplies all deficiencies by his courage, and imposing upon the enemy with a confident front, marches boldly to battle….

IN 1653 Marshal Turenne was surprised by the Prince of Condé, in a position in which his army was completely compromised. He had the power, indeed, by an immediate retreat, of covering himself by the Somme, which he possessed the means of crossing at Peronne, and from whence he was distant only half a league; but fearing the influence of this retrograde movement on the moral of his army, Turenne balanced all disadvantages by his courage, and marched boldly to meet the enemy with very inferior forces. After marching a league he found an advantageous position, where he made every disposition for a battle. It was three o’clock in the afternoon, but the Spaniards, exhausted with fatigue, hesitated to attack him, and Turenne having covered himself with entrenchments during the night, the enemy no longer dared to risk a general action, and broke up his camp.

CHANDLER: Mediocre generals holding poor positions and seeking refuge in retreat before even inferior forces, never mind superior ones, are not hard to discover in 20th century military history. One thinks of such Italian commanders as Generals Maletta and “Electric-Whiskers” Berghenzoli being forced out of position after position in Egypt and then Libya by General O’Connor’s Western Desert Force in 1940–1, which never numbered more than 20,000 men. Similarly, the British defence of the Malayan Peninsula against the smaller Japanese army of General Mutaguchi in late 1941 to early 1942 left something to be desired, although Japanese air superiority and continuous enveloping marches through “impenetrable” jungle had much to do with the incessant British retreats over some 500 miles down to Singapore island.

History also provides many instances of great captains overcoming deficiencies by bold, determined action – or sheer bluff. Marlborough, rarely at a numerical advantage before 1709, was a master at imposing his will upon stronger foes. The risk-defying 300-mile march to the Danube from The Netherlands in 1704 is a good strategic example; his forcing battles on Tallard at Blenheim (1704), on Villeroi at Ramillies (1706) and on Vendôme at Oudenarde (1708) were all masterpieces of operational art. Similarly, Frederick the Great’s bold use of the central position in 1757 to push back one encircling foe after another (resulting in the great victories of Rossbach and Leuthen) is another. Napoleon’s record on this score in both 1796 and 1815 – at each extremity of his active career – needs no elaboration here. He was a master at seizing and exploiting the initiative against superior foes, at mentally dominating his opponent, even if on some occasions his opportunistic gambling failed to come off (as at Waterloo). Rommel and Giap were generals made in the same mould in at least this particular respect.

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